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I. Introduction
Transnational air pollution from forest fires, for the first time,
became a tragic reality on a worldwide basis during 1997 and
1998. Occasioning loss of human life and property, these same
fires also caused enormous loss of biodiversity since they raged in
the rich tropical forests around the equator and in rich Siberian
boreal forests on three different continents. The acute air pollu-
tion in Southeast Asia alone impaired the health and property of
millions of people. In addition to the immediate damage caused by
forest fires, the releases of carbon dioxide, which has warming ef-
fects as a green house gas, and of aerosols, which reflect sunlight
and thus have a cooling effect, have a complicated effect on
Earth's climate.1 Many of these fires started as the result of
human activities, and most burned without the benefit of any fire
control measures.
The scope of these fires was unprecedented. In May of 1998,
state environmental protection officials in Texas declared the air
unfit to breathe from the coast of the Gulf of Mexico for over 100
miles inland, and the entire state went on an air pollution alert.2
Hazy skies were reported as far north as Colorado and South Da-
kota. 3 The smoke caused health problems and cut visibility. The
fires were burning in Mexico, which was experiencing its worst
drought in seventy years. The number of forest fires reached
11,000 from an average of 7,000. Over 1,500 square miles
burned.4
Meanwhile, during the same year, forest fires in Central
America consumed 2,150 square miles of forests, primarily in"
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 5 The Mexican fires af-
fected this region also. Smoke from the fires caused dense haze
1. See Forest Fires in Russia Will Add to Global Warming, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Oct. 21, 1998, available at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/
FA3119BF54376B64C12566A5002FD96E. The Deputy Chief of Goskomecologia, the
State Committee for Environmental Protection (Russia's environmental ministry at
the time) and Dr. Amirkhan Amirkhanov, reported that the fires in 1998 on the Is-
land of Sakhalin (where two-thirds of the island were subject to fires) and the fires in
the Khabarovsk and Primorye provinces resulted in the emission of tens of millions of
tons of carbon dioxide. See generally id.
2. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Texans Coping With Smoke Cloud From Fires in
Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1998, at A10.
3. See Americans Ready to Battle Fires, Warn That Relief is Weeks Away, CHI.
TRIB., May 24, 1998 at 1.
4. See Eugene Linden, Smoke Signals Vast Forest Fires Have Scarred the Globe,
But the Worst May be Yet to Come, TiME, June 22, 1998, at 1.
5. See id.
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across the region, closing all four international airports in
Honduras. 6
During the same period, forest fires in Africa burned around
Mt. Kilimanjaro in Tanzania, as well as in Kenya, Rwanda, Congo
and Senegal, all exacerbated by the drought accompanying El
Nifio weather patterns in Africa. 7 In South America, fires in Bra-
zil consumed some 20,000 square miles, or an area half the size of
New York State. The journal, Nature, called the Brazilian pat-
terns of unmanaged logging that led to new surface fires and a
cycle of forest impoverishment that contributed to further fires, a
kind of "cryptic deforestation."8 In Siberia, 15,000 forest fires in
1997 and over 19,000 in 1999 burned with little effective means of
extinguishing them.9 Some fire fighting forces and equipment
reached the peat forest fires in Belarus and European Russia, 10
but substantial burning was not controlled."
Perhaps the most extensive and acute forest fire phenomena
were found in South East Asia. The fires of 1997 in Kalimantan
and Sumatra, Indonesia, and in parts of Malaysia and Papua New
Guinea, produced plumes of smoke that blanketed Singapore and
Malaysia and reached the Philippines and Thailand. To imagine
the breadth of the disaster, it is as if forest fire smoke covered an
area as extensive as the United States, or both East and West Eu-
rope. Singapore, which has strong domestic air pollution control
systems and clear air, was enveloped with air unfit to breathe.
6. See Forest Fires' Smoke Closes 4 Airports, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1998, at 1. See
also Mexico Will Use U.S. Help to Fight Forest, Bush Fires, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 1998
(stating that the "air quality is ... equivalent to smoking four packs of cigarettes per
day").
7. See Linden, supra note 4, at 1.
8. Daniel C. Nepstad et al., Large-Scale Impoverishment of Amazonian Forests
by Logging and Fire, 398 NATURE 505 (1999).
9. The sheer scope of the fires overwhelmed the Russian Federation Ministry for
Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters
(EMERCOM), the Ministry of the Interior and Forest Ministry. Ilyshin-76 water
bombing airplanes were used, but there was insufficient aerial surveillance and com-
munications and adequate capacity to fight fires on the ground were ground. See U.N.
OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR-
EST FIRES - OCHA SITUATION REPORT No. 1 (July 28, 1999), available at http:ll
wwww.reliefweb.inttW/RWB.NSF/S/70231B411857B9F9C12567BC0056B955.
10. See Marina Koreneva, Russia's Taiga Burns as Heatwave Keeps Up, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, July 16, 1999, available at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/
62508C91D334616FC12567C400661B20.
11. See Eric S. Kasische et al., Satellite Imagery Gives Clear Picture of Russia's
Boreal Forests, 80 Eos TRANSACTIONS, AM. GEOPHYSICAL UNION 141 (1999); see also
DAVID HERRING, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY, EOSTuDy: EVOLVING IN THE PRESENCE
OF FIRE 1999), available at http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Study/BOREASFire.
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The transnational air pollution caused health problems and mea-
surably damaged the economy in Singapore, in Brunei and in
Malaysia. 12
The occurrence of these forest fires in the same temporal span
has been attributed to the climate phenomenon of the El Niflo/
Southern Oscillation, which brings drought conditions to the ar-
eas where these fires took place. The dry weather also heightens
the likelihood of fires, and the lack of rain exacerbates the disper-
sion of the air pollution from the fires. El Niflo is a shift in Pacific
Ocean temperatures and atmospheric conditions that alter wind
patterns. This phenomenon was first identified nearly a century
ago by Peruvian fishermen, who gave it the name of the Christ
child since the peak of the phenomenon appears around the De-
cember celebration of Christ's birth. 13 It is now thought that
these events appear cyclically, and have been going on for a much
longer period of time. Contemporary advances in scientific detec-
tion, monitoring and modeling have made it possible to study the
El Nifio/Southern Oscillation effects.' 4 After the drought and El
Nifto, the wind patterns shift and the La Nifia phenomenon brings
excessive rainfall, often to the same regions that endured the
drought. If forest fires have denuded the hills, this deluge of rain
can cause severe erosion and flooding since tree cover no longer
exists to soak up the rain and the roots no longer hold the soil
against the water run-off.
While the dry conditions of El Nifto may have prepared the
dry and hot conditions that fanned the flames, the weather was
not the cause of the forest fires. The fires ignited and grew out of
control because of a variety of causes, which were overwhelmingly
induced by human behavior. In each region, however, some vari-
ables remained the same. Lightning caused some fires, but many
were set to clear tropical forest cover for agricultural purposes.
Except in Russia, the human populations are increasing in the re-
gions where the fires take place. Many people live in and near the
forests, as population growth has brought human habitats closer
to forestlands. In every case, there was no long-standing system
12. See Michael Brauer & Jamal Hisham-Hashim, Fires in Indonesia: Crisis and
Reaction, 32 ENVTL. SCIENCE & TECH. 404A, 405A-406A (1998).
13. See U.S. Nat'l Atmosphere & Oceanic Admin. (NOAA), Frequently Asked
Question about El Nio & La Nifa, available at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/toga-toa/
el-nino/faq.html (last modified Jan. 25, 2001).
14. See J. Madeleine Nash, Fire and Rain: El Nihio's Fury can Still be Seen in
Drought and Raging Blazes of Borneo; Now Asia Must Prepare for a Possible Deluge
from La Nifia, TIME INTL, April 20, 1998, at 1.
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of local fire prevention, no training to curb fires, and virtually no
organized fire fighting capacity. In each case, the fires were not
fully extinguished by man but by the rains of nature. In most
places there was no alternative but to get out of the way of the fire
and wait for the rains, which were slow to come because of the dry
weather conditions. Finally, all of these fires took place in some of
the most biologically diverse and rich areas of the Earth; the loss
of forest habitat adversely affects endemic and migratory species.
Traditionally, the law and governmental policy have regarded
forest fires, like fires in cities, quintessentially as local matters to
be addressed by domestic policy and municipal legal
frameworks. 15 For decades, if a nation chose to allow its forest
fires to burn until rainfall extinguished them, as was largely the
case in the Soviet Union, such a governmental response was not
considered an appropriate question for international law. Even at
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UN-
CED), the 1992 "Earth Summit," there was an assumed consensus
among the sovereign states that a nation's forests were its own
business. 16 UNCED declined to advance proposals for a treaty on
forests and their management, and adopted "non-binding forest
principles" as a modest foundation for future discussions. 17 These
Forest Principles recognized the responsibility of States to ensure
that activities within their jurisdictions do not damage the envi-
ronment of other states or areas beyond the limits of national ju-
risdiction,18 but at the same time considered that each State has a
"sovereign right to utilize, manage and develop their forests,"' 9
and that this should be done in an ecologically sustainable way.
20
Never do the Principles address the phenomena of forest fires, al-
though they extol the many and varied values of the forest for
human society. Since fires ravish these values, the failure to refer-
ence forest fires is remarkable; so intent were the delegates in pre-
serving their national rights to control their forests that they
15. See, e.g., Norman J. Weiner, Uncle Sam and Forest Fires: His Rights and Re-
sponsibilities, 15 ENVTL. L. 623 (1985).
16. See generally Non-Legally Binding Forest Principles, U.N. Conference on
Env't and Dev., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 881 (1992) [hereinafter Non-Legally Binding Forest Principles].
17. Id.
18. See id. princ. 1.
19. See id. princ. 2(a).
20. See id. princ. 2(b).
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neglected the potential roles for international cooperation in
preventing and containing forest fires. 21
The failure to reference forest fires at UNCED also is found in
principal outcome of the Earth Summit, its action plan, Agenda
21.22 The Agenda 21 chapter on "Combating Deforestation," pays
scant attention to forest fires by merely including references to the
"lack of adequate forest-fire control" and the anti-poaching of tim-
ber in a long list of threats to forests world wide.23 There is no
mention of international or regional cooperation to address the
need to build capacity to combat forest fires. In the chapters of
Agenda 21 on combating desertification, 24 managing mountain re-
gions, 25 or on conserving biological diversity,26 there is no mention
of how forest fires leave the land denuded and subject to erosion,
thereby inducing desertification, eroding mountains and causing
flooding, and destroying biologically diverse habitats. It is as if
the nations at the Earth Summit chose to assume that each nation
could look after its own forest fires and that the issue should not
be inscribed on the priority list for the world.
The forest fire events of 1997-98 have changed this situation;
even if Earth's nations remain slow to acknowledge the fact. What
was once deemed exclusively to be a problem of domestic, munici-
pal law, is now squarely a common concern of nations and a
proper focus for international public law. This is so because of the
transboundary pollution caused by the smoke of fires, 27 and the
destruction of habitat for migratory species, 28 but is also so be-
cause of the destruction of biodiversity in contravention of under-
21. See generally Non-Legally Binding Forest Principles, supra note 16. Article 5
of the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity notes, for instance, that "Each Con-
tracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, cooperate with other Con-
tracting Parties . . . on matters of mutual interest, for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity." U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity,
opened for signature June 5, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-20 (1993), reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity].
22. See AGENDA 21: EARTH's ACTION PLAN 161-63 (Nicholas A. Robinson ed.,
1993).
23. See id. at 166.
24. See generally id. ch. 12.
25. See generally id. ch. 13.
26. See generally id. ch. 15.
27. The transboundary impacts contravene Principle 21 of the U.N. Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment (repeated as Principle 2 of the Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development), as general principle of law binding on all
nations, and also Article 3 of the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity. See gener-
ally Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 21, art. 3.
28. The loss of habitat contravenes the duty to conserve in situ biodiversity under
the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 21, and also the Bonn Treaty
464 [Vol. 18
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol18/iss2/9
FOREST FIRES
takings in the Convention on Biological Diversity to integrate the
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity into each nation's
plans, programs and policies. 29 Insofar as the burning of Earth's
forests contributes to climate change, a "common concern" of hu-
mankind, the fires do not protect the climate system "for the bene-
fit of present or future generations of humankind."30  The
devastating effects of forest fires in 1997-98 are likely to be re-
vised during the next El Nifio phenomena, and before that eventu-
ality is the time for the international community to take action.
This article will examine (a) how traditional principles of
state responsibility under international public law address the is-
sue of transboundary pollution from forest fires, (b) what the ap-
plication of basic rules of international cooperation under the
United Nations Charter meant for the fires of Mexico and Indone-
sia, and (c) since both the rules of state responsibility and of the
obligation to cooperate are woefully short of producing sustainable
human systems to prevent and cope with forest fires, how the
principles of environmental law should be marshaled to guide gov-
ernmental systems to manage forest fires consistently at the local,
national or international levels. Unless the governmental and
non-governmental interests that care about the health and bi-
odiversity of the world's forests give forest fire protection a much
higher priority than they do at present, their efforts to pass on the
forest resources of Earth to the next generations will fall woefully
short.
Forest fires today have become more than an act of God or a
dramatic and tragic event. Such fires now endanger the public
health and safety across national borders. In addition, forest fires
impoverish the world's scarce gene bank, diminishing a global re-
source that is of common concern to mankind. Since humans be-
gan to use wood for their needs, some eighty percent of the forests
that originally covered the various continents have been cleared
and converted to fragmented, degraded or non-forest uses. 31 The
remaining forestlands with biological value are found in the Ama-
zon Basin, Central Africa, South East Asia, as well as the boreal
forests of Canada, Russia and the United States. Of these regions,
on Migratory Species. See Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of
Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 11 (1980).
29. See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 21, art. 6, 31 I.L.M. at 825.
30. U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev.: Framework Convention on Climate Change,
art. 3(1), 31 I.L.M. 849, 854.
31. See The Global Forest Watch Database, available at http://
www.globalforestwatch.org (last visited Apr. 25, 2001).
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only Canada and the United States have the capacity to use fires
in forests as a management technique and to detect and control
forest fires. Even in these states, however, the task is not easy.
Vast fires in the Florida Everglades required evacuations in
1998,32 and horrific fires in New Mexico in 1996 burned vast areas
of parks and national forests, as well as human settlements. 33
Without a better global effort to prevent and cope with forest
fires, the remaining wild forests' resources of the world are at risk.
Quite apart from the present loss of commercial timber and spe-
cies habitat, and the present problems of flooding and erosion in
the aftermath of fires, the loss of these wooded lands will reduce
the capacity of regions to absorb carbon dioxide through photosyn-
thesis, thereby making the challenge of managing emissions of
green house gases all the more problematic. Forests sequester
carbon in their woody tissue as a result of photosynthesis, and are
often termed the "lungs" of the Earth.34 The recurring forest fire
events put much more at stake than just the apparently transient
and dramatic event of the fire itself. How does, or should, the law
attend to this situation?
II. Traditional International Law & State Responsibility
Under the United Nations Charter and principles of interna-
tional law, states have the "responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the en-
vironment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction."35 This settled principle of international law, Princi-
ple 21, makes it clear that if a state allows air pollution from its
forest fires to damage another state, then it is responsible for com-
pensating the other state for that damage. This Principle has
been cited in the case of treaties dealing with abatement of indus-
trial acid rain36 and indeed was codified from the early air pollu-
tion arbitral decision in The Trail Smelter Arbitration (United
32. See Sarah Lundy & Larry Barszewski, Brush Fires Keep Water Battlers Busy -
30 MPH Winds Fan Blazes Near Lion Country Safari Reserve, SUN-SENTINEL FT. LAU-
DERDALE, Apr. 10, 1998, at lB.
33. See 1,000 Flee From Fire in New Mexico, WASH. POST, May 7, 1996.
34. See, e.g., AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 121-22 (1992).
35. See Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16,
1972, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14Rev.1 (1973), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416
(1972).
36. See U.N. ECE, Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov.
13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541, pmbl., reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979).
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States and Canada).37 The Principle was reiterated in the Decla-
ration of Rio de Janeiro on Environment and Development
adopted at the U.N. Earth Summit in 1992.38
Whether one considers the air pollution from the fires to have
damaged a nation's people and resources under the Corfu Channel
case, 39 or considers the damage to have harmed a common and
shared resources in the "air shed" under the Lake Lanoux Arbitra-
tion,4o it is evident that the state which is the source of the pollu-
tion would be liable for the damage caused.
Yet, would claims of injury and demands for compensation,
arbitration or litigation before the International Court of Justice
have any beneficial effect in such a circumstance? Forest fires
erupt rapidly and are unplanned events. When there is a fire,
there is precious little time for prior notice and consultation with
states located down-wind about an impending transboundary im-
pact. After the event, the quantification of the widespread dam-
age often is difficult at best; a state will ask whether it is worth
the effort of calculating the quantification and managing the de-
mand. How will the damaged state, in turn, compensate its own
nationals? Finally, would a damage award achieve deterrence or
encourage better care to prevent the forest fires? After the fires,
there is vast damage to repair and scarce resources to prevent fu-
ture fires. Moreover, even if one were to view the statistical likeli-
hood that there will be more forest fires, and thus further damage
in the future, is this not a risk that the state enduring the fires is
taking, and a risk, that the state suffering the air pollution, is
aware of and accepting by its inaction? It is hard to see how the
concepts of liability in international responsibility may be a useful
concept to either deter future forests or insist on measures to pre-
vent the fires. It is evident that traditional international public
law has little to offer to solve the problems of transnational forest
fire air pollution.
One analogous situation is the air pollution caused by Iraq's
burning of the oil wells and reserves in Kuwait during the Persian
Gulf War. Iraq deliberately bombed the largest Kuwaiti oil field,
two refineries, an offshore loading terminal, tanks, and tankers,
37. See 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arbitration Awards 1911, 1938 (1941); reprinted in 35
AM J. INTL. L. 684 (1941).
38. See Non-Legally Binding Forest Principles, supra note 16, princ. 2, at 874.
39. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
40. See Affaire du Lac Lanoux [Lake Lanoux Arbitration] (Fr. v. Spain), 12
R.I.A.A., 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957).
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as it withdrew from Kuwait. 41 Although the armed conflict ceased
on March 1, 1991, the fires continued to burn for weeks, emitting
a plume twenty-two thousand feet into the atmosphere and caus-
ing blackened snow in the Himalayan Mountains of Pakistan and
Nepal. 42 The health impacts on people and the continuing dam-
age to ecosystems has been assessed as part of the post-war claims
settlements. 43 Once the claims are determined, the methodology
and quantification of air pollution damage claims may provide a
precedent that could be used for acute injury from forest fire
incidents.
There have been no effective claims or remedies from the
transboundary radioactive pollution that resulted from the fires at
the Chernobyl nuclear power reactor in the USSR on April 26,
1986. People continue to suffer a slow death in Belarus from this
incident in the Ukraine.44 Given the failure of international pub-
lic law to address the aftermath of Chernobyl itself,45 it is hard to
envision states organizing to address the equally troublesome af-
termath of the forest fires. The Foreign Affairs Ministries of
states would rather not raise troublesome claims with their neigh-
boring states, and the public is either denied legal recourse or is
passive to demand action from their foreign affairs ministries.
Unlike the air pollution from Kuwaiti fires resulting from armed
conflict, the civilian forest fires or the civilian nuclear reactor fires
have not produced concerted state recourse to the traditional rules
of international law.
III. The International Law Obligation of Cooperation
The Charter of the United Nations is premised on the princi-
ple of cooperation. Through the Charter, states founded the
United Nations "to achieve international co-operation in solving
41. See Jennifer Parmalee, Kuwaiti Emir Snuffs Out Last Iraqi-Lit Oil Fire,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1991, at Al cited in Jesica E. Seacor, Environmental Terrorism:
Lessons From the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 481, 482 n.4
(1994).
42. See generally Seacor, supra note 41.
43. See generally Tiffani Y. Lee, Note, Environmental Liability Provisions Under
the U.N. Compensation Commission: Remarkable Achievements With Room for Im-
proved Voluntary Deterrence, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (1998).
44. See, e.g., Alice Lagnado, The Nuclear Family: Chernobyl, SCOTLAND ON SUN-
DAY, Feb. 11, 2001.
45. There were, of course, new treaties negotiated after Chernobyl to cope with
the eventuality of another such incident, but not much done with issues of State re-
sponsibility for the incident itself See International Atomic Energy Agency: Conven-
tions on Nuclear Accidents, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1369, 1377 (1986).
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international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humani-
tarian character .. *"46 As Professor Wolfgang Friedmann ex-
plains, international law is strengthened by "the gradual
emergence of an international law of cooperation, implemented by
an increasing number of international organizations, pursuing the
common interests of mankind in the fields of economic and social
development, health, communications, and other matters of
human welfare." 47
Given the interdependence of the natural systems of the bio-
sphere, it is normal that states seek to cooperate on common mat-
ters of environmental protection. The Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development of 1992 expressly provides that
"States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to con-
serve, protect, and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's
ecosystem. In view of the differentiated contributions to global en-
vironmental degradation, States have common but differentiated
responsibilities."4 Cooperation on matters of environmental pro-
tection is widely accepted as a basic obligation of international
law.
The question that should be asked, however, is whether a
minimum level of cooperation, or merely not frustrating coopera-
tion "by sitting on the sidelines," is sufficient for a state to meet its
duty to cooperate. It is evident that whether a state has satisfied
its duty to cooperate should depend on a good faith effort to act
effectively, given the common, but differentiated, responsibilities
various states may have depending on their circumstances.
The test to determine whether this obligation to cooperate in
international law has been satisfied should be whether the re-
sponse was proportional to the demand, in light of the resources of
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
47. Wolfgang Friedmann, The Role of International Law in the Conduct of Inter-
national Affairs, 20 INT'L J. 158, 159 (1965).
48. U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, Rio DECLARATION ON ENV'T & DEV., U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/26, Annex I, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1972), available at http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/confl5l/aconfl5l26-lannexl.htm.
Principle 7. States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to con-
serve, protest, and restore the heath and integrity of the Earth's ecosys-
tem. In my view of the different contributions to global environmental
degradations, states have common but differentiated responsibilities.
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in
international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures
their societies place on the global environment and on of the technologies
and financial resources they command.
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the states involved.49 If states effectively cooperated to abate the
problem, then the level of such action may be deemed adequate to
satisfy the duty to cooperate under international law. If the prob-
lem continued or worsened, despite the cooperation, then patently,
the duty to cooperate was not satisfied. This proportionality test,
put in context by the "common but differentiated responsibilities"
measurement, provides a measuring system by which to test the
performance of states as to their duty to cooperate. In this setting,
it permits the analysis of state conduct, with respect to the obliga-
tion to cooperate, in the same way that state responsibility does
with respect to the obligations of Principle 21 discussed above.
In the context of the forest fires, as soon as the transnational
threat became apparent, the states inaugurated substantial ef-
forts at cooperation. As will be seen, these presently fall short of
being an effective step to ensure that future fires will be averted
or contained. While sincere and well-intended measures were
taken to cooperate in the abatement of the fires, the proportional-
ity test posited above was not satisfied. Nonetheless, the rules of
cooperation were taken seriously, thereby motivating humanita-
rian actions, which, in turn, had a greater effect than did the con-
sideration of the traditional rules of state responsibility discussed
above. This can be seen in the disposition of largely bilateral as-
sistance for the fires in Mexico and in the context of the largely
multilateral assistance for the fires in Indonesia.
A. The Mexican Forest Fire Catastrophe
Once the magnitude of the Mexican fires became apparent,
the United States undertook to offer assistance. Brian Atwood,
head of the United States Agency for International Development,
made clear that the United States' interest in the problem ex-
tended nationally, and not just as a regional United Nations inter-
est to protect the affected regions of Texas.
This disaster in Mexico has to be the most serious of its kind
we have seen anywhere in the world, including the fires in Indone-
sia. American people wonder why we should care about the fires in
Mexico. It is not just the smoke and haze that is affecting the
49. See Jessica Myers, Henderson Discusses Smallpox Eradication, THE JoHNs
HOPKINS NEWSLETTER, Mar. 8, 2001, available at http://www.jhu.edu/-newslett/03-8-
OLNews/4.html.
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United States as far north as Wisconsin and as far east as Geor-
gia, but it is the potential loss of biodiversity.50
The fires in the Chimalapas Biological Reserve, for instance,
endangered fifteen hundred of the world's most endangered spe-
cies of plants and ninety percent of the migratory birds that fly
between the United States, Canada, and South America and use
the Reserve.
The fires in Mexico roared through eleven of the thirty-one
Mexican states and caused extensive damage to a quarter of the
forest in the Desierto de Los Leones National Park at the edge of
Mexico City, cloaking the capital in soot for over a week.51 The
Mexican Secretariat of the Environment (SEMARNAP) reported
that eighty percent of the fires were burning in areas inhabited by
people, with grave risk to life and health. In Chiapas, the smoke
and fog were so thick that headlights were needed at midday. 52 In
response, Mexico mobilized resources to fight the fires and to
avert their recurrence. Thirty thousand military personnel and
6,000 civilians were reportedly deployed to fight the fires. The vol-
unteers had little training, or for that matter, time for it. 53 It was
reported, as of April 1998, that six helicopters and two light air-
craft were tracking the fires, but only one Canadian aircraft
equipped to water bomb the fires was in use.54 The fire patterns
could not be tracked because the smoke's thickness prevented the
planes from flying at an adequate range. Only in May 1998 did
the United States government provide a King Air plane equipped
50. See Species Could be Lost in Mexico Forest Fires, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1998, at
1.
51. See Molly Moore, Fires Devastate Mexico; Blazes Destroy Nearly 300,000 Acres
in 112 States, WASH. POST, April 12, 1998, at Al.
52. See id. at A21.
53. See Molly Moore, Mexico's Unquenchable Fires: Ecological Disaster Unfolds as
Ancient Forest Burns On, WASH. POST, May 31, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Moore, Mex-
ico's Unquenchable Fires].
Antonio Juarez is a foot soldier on the front lines of firefighter hell. His
weapons against southern Mexico's worst fires in a century are a machete
and five gallons of water in a rubber backpack. The peasant farmer, 51,
charges into burning rubble clad in sandals, a straw cowboy hat and a
tattered bandanna. His future mission: to help hold back the raging wild-
fires that are gobbling Mexico's last remaining virgin cloud forest, torch-
ing the trees that are home to nesting toucans and quetzals, charring tens
of thousands of acres of hunting territory of endangered jaguars and
pumas, and creeping beneath the thick blankets of lichen and mosses on
the forest floor to consume the roots of rare flora.
Id.
54. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MEXICO HAS FOREST FIRES, Too (1998), available at
1998 WL 9038073.
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with infrared sensors to find fires beneath the cloud forest canopy
of the tropical forest.55 The United States sent forty-five fire-
fighting experts to assist from May 16 to July 6, 1998.56 Some $8
million was allocated to assist Mexico. 57 Over fifty fire fighters
and members of special brigades died in Mexico fighting the
fires.58 In the central state of Michigan, 100 villagers tried to save
part of the forest areas used as the wintering habitat for the mi-
gratory Monarch Butterfly, by bringing buckets of water two
hours from their village. 59 Given the lack of resources to fight
such widespread fires and the magnitude of the fires, these re-
sponse efforts were simply insufficient to bring the crisis under
control. Despite these efforts, many fires burned until extin-
guished by the rains in late June, while others kept burning into
July.60
The causes of the Mexican fires were varied, yet ninety per-
cent were attributed to human negligence and only ten percent to
natural causes. 61 These causes include actions by farmers to clear
land for expanded agricultural uses and others by narcotic traders
to raise poppies or marijuana. Many fires were started by the
careless disposal of cigarettes by drivers of cars and trucks, others
by recreationalists or vacationers. A small percentage was cre-
ated by natural causes. 62 In response, Mexico is reported to have
proposed an educational program to persuade farmers not to use
fire to burn off trees in preparation for planting or grazing. Pro-
posals have been made that the setting of intentional fires should
be classified as an environmental crime. However, as of mid May,
only 109 investigations of the some 10,000 fires had been under-
taken. 63 Even if the leads for investigations are promising, the
55. See Moore, Mexico's Unquenchable Fires, supra note 53.
66. See Smoky Skies From Mexican Fires Clear As Texas Heats Up, FLORIDA To-
DAY, Aug. 8, 1998, at A9.
57. See Carlos Freymann, Mexico's Blazes Should Spark Fire Prevention Pro-
grams, SAN ANTONIO Bus. J., July 3, 1998, at 29.
58. See Molly Moore, Wildfires in Mexico, Central America Burn Unabated;
Smoke extends as Far North as Wisconsin, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998, at A15 [herein-
after Moore, Wildfires in Mexico]. See also Diego Cevallos, Environment.Mexico: Fires
Cause Worst Tragedy in 50 Years, Inter-Press Service, Apr. 2, 1998, available at http:/
/www.oneworld.org/ips2/apr98/16-06-072.html. Diego Cevallos estimated the num-
bers at twenty in his report. See id.
59. See Moore, Wildfires in Mexico, supra note 58.
60. See id.
61. See Fires Devouring Forests, MEX. Bus. MONTHLY, May 1, 1998.
62. See id.
63. See Molly Moore, Wildfires in Mexico, supra note 58.
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fires destroy all evidence of negligent or criminal activity; arson is
nearly impossible to establish absent eyewitnesses.
It is interesting to note that the North American Commission
on Environmental Cooperation (CEC),64 organized under the En-
vironment Side Agreement 65 for the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),66 would have the legal authority to fashion
a cooperation between Canada, the United States and Mexico to
address forest fire management. Unlike the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which at once began consultation
regarding how to cooperate to prevent and cope with fires in Asia,
the CEC has yet to respond seriously to this tragic economic and
ecological and human disaster in its territory. While some might
argue that the CEC is, perhaps, too new an institution to take on
such a task, there are already very effective compacts and treaties
for the deployment of fire fighters from various states and prov-
inces in the United States and Canada;67 the model already exists
among two of the three partner nations. The CEC would do well to
facilitate the operational cooperation with Mexico to replicate
such systems between that nation and the other two. This poten-
tial for cooperation remains to be realized.
These accounts of the responses to the Mexican and Central
American forest fires indicate that there was an immediate hu-
manitarian response to cooperate with Mexico on the part of the
United States. However, the rapid expansion of the fires, exacer-
bated by the very dry El Nifio weather patterns, rendered the na-
tional and international responses inadequate to the problem.
Clearly, whether the rules of international cooperation are being
effectively embraced must be measured by whether the response
is proportional to the need. In the case of Mexico, the national
64. See North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation, available at
http://www.cec.org. (last visited May 21, 2001). The seat of the CEC is in Montreal.
65. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),
Nov. 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) (also known as the Environmental Side Agreement).
66. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 19 U.S.C. § 3301
(1998).
67. See, e.g., Northeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact (which cov-
ers the northeast United States and adjacent areas of Canada), 1949, continued in
1963, reprinted in N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 9-1123 (McKinney 1991). Had there
been fire-fighting agreements between Texas and Mexican States, fire-fighting help
could have been provided. As governor of Texas, George W. Bush was reported to have
offered to send State forest teams and helicopters to Mexico to join in fighting the fires
if the State could be reimbursed for the cost, as is usual under such forest fighting
compacts. See William Branigin, Smoke From Mexico Fires Prompts Health Alert in
Texas, WASH. POST, May 16, 1998, at All.
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response was not adequate and the international response on the
part of the United States, as a neighboring state, was also clearly
inadequate.
B. The Indonesian and South East Asia Forest Conflagration
The case of Mexico can be contrasted with that of Indonesia
and the South East Asian international response. In Asia, a much
more deliberative pattern emerged, launching a more pervasive
form of cooperation, but did not have much more of an effect than
ultimately was seen in the North American context. Like the bi-
lateral help to Mexico, this system of cooperation provided too lit-
tle, too late, to be effective in helping to cope with the fires, and
was not proportional to the task.
Indonesia confronted the worst drought in fifty years, ex-
tending over more than one year. For the first eighty-nine days of
1998, not a drop of rain fell in East Kalimantan. 68 In June the
fires began, and efforts to protect the people and to save the re-
maining 20,000 orangutans proved difficult. Wildlife conservation
teams rescued some 200 orangutans, many of which were badly
burned.69 Villages had captured many abandoned baby orang-
utans, hoping to sell them to get cash to live on. As Willie Smits of
the Warariset Forestry Station described it, "In East Kalimantan,
the situation is desperate - for both people and orangutans. There
is no a conflict for survival."70 This vignette captures the crisis.
People have died because of the lack of food and protection and
biodiversity has been lost in Indonesia. Ill-equipped citizens rose
to fight the fires and protect the rare habitats around them, such
as the Kota Kinabatangan forests. 71 Indonesia is estimated to
have lost $4.5 billion in fire related damage, including loss of tim-
ber, agriculture, biodiversity, health impacts, loss of tourism, loss
68. See Indonesia: Orangutan Population in Kalimantan Projected to Drop by
30%, ANTARA-THE INDON. NAT'L NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 4, 2000.
69. See id.
70. J. Medeleine Nash, Floods and Fires? They're Just the Beginning of El Niho's
Impact, TIME, June 1, 1998, at 26.
71. See, e.g., The Burning Issue, SING. ENvTL. COUNCIL, vol. 5, no. 2 (1998):
Last month office workers in Sabah put down their briefcases and rolled
up their trouser legs to join rangers from the Kota Kinabatangan forestry
department. Together they tackled the fires which were raging in the
region- one of the country's most important conservation areas and a ma-
jor breeding ground for some of Asia's rarest animals, including probiscis
monkeys, orangutan and elephants. These Sabah firefighters were just
some of a largely unsung army of "conservation heroes."
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of industrial output, and other related losses. This sum is more
than double all the foreign assistance received by Indonesia annu-
ally the year before, and is about 2.5% of Indonesia's Gross Na-
tional Product. Had a foreigner caused the damage, the claim in
this amount would be more than the combined legal liabilities as-
sessed by the Exxon Valdez and Bhopal tragedies. 72
In light of the losses in Indonesia (estimated at 4.5 million
hectares in 1997 alone), and that many more millions of people
were injured throughout southeast Asia than had been injured in
Mexico, it is evident that the head of the United States Agency for
International Development was speaking out of ignorance when
he classified the losses in Mexico as worse than those in Indone-
sia. As the Assistant Executive Director of the United Nations En-
vironment Programme stated, "the forest fires of Indonesia have
been categorized as an environmental emergency of exceptional
proportions."73 UNEP endorses that conclusion, aware as it is of
the status of Indonesia as one of the twelve "mega-biodiversity"
countries of the world, rich in species, many unique to that nation
and deserving of international protection. Indonesia possesses
eleven percent of the world's known flowering plans, twelve per-
cent of the world's mammals, fifteen percent of all amphibians and
reptiles, and some thirty-seven of the world's fish.74
Indeed, the United States National Atmospheric and Oceanic
Administration (NOAA) monitored the Indonesia crisis by satel-
lite because the area where fires were widespread was too vast for
monitoring by airplane and the satellite systems were in place to
monitor the fires. 75 The United States and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank allocated $6 million to assist Indonesia and neighbor-
ing states to cope with the environmental disasters of the fires.
Other nations also made similarly modest bilateral grants of hu-
manitarian assistance.
72. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND FOR NATURE & ECON. AND ENV'T PROGRAM FOR
SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE INDONESIAN FIRES AND HAZE OF 1997: THE ECONOMIC TOLL,
available at http://www.eepsea.org/publications/researchl/ACF62.html (last modified
June 23, 2000).
73. Id.
74. See Jorge Illueca, Address to the Singapore Environment Council Policy Dia-
logue on Southeast Asian Forest Fires (June 4-5, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Illueca].
75. See, e.g., G. Gutman et al., Using NOAA/AVHRR Products to Monitor El
Niho Impacts: Focus on Indonesia in 1997-98, BULL. OF THE AM. METEOROLOGICAL
Soc'y, June 1, 2000.
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Both the forest fires in Mexico and in Indonesia were unprece-
dented and enormous, but if one measures the environmental and
economic impact that Indonesia had on its neighbors, it is evident
that the Indonesian crisis eclipses the great loss in Mexico. Singa-
pore and Malaysia each provided air pollution alert information
on the Internet, so that individuals could take action to protect
their health by assessing the pollution index directly.76 The
"haze" damage to Singapore has been estimated at $74.1 million
and Malaysia's losses at $310 million.77 The lost tourism income
from the air pollution is readily quantified. In addition, the im-
pacts of the Indonesian fires that were located on the island of
Borneo, on the adjacent nation of Brunei Darussalam, and on the
adjacent Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, were acute in
health impacts and lost of natural resources.78
Brunei Darussalam does not have the problem with palm oil
or timber plantations that Indonesia or parts of Malaysia experi-
ence. Fires spread into Brunei from over the Indonesian and Ma-
laysian border. This disrupted life in Brunei substantially. The
experience of the Shell Oil refinery in Brunei illustrates this. The
Brunei Shell Petroleum Company is responsible for some 4,000
persons, including dependents. The air pollution was so acute in
Brunei during the period of the fires that it exceeded maximum
health limits (100 PSI) repeatedly; indoor air was often measured
at 200 PSI. Workers regularly had to volunteer to fight fires in
order to prevent their spread. Shell had to invest $3 million just
in disbursements to fight fires, secure the health of its workers,
and keep its refinery open in conditions of near zero visibility; this
figure does not include the lost revenues when production was
shut down.79
The causes of the fires in Indonesia were partially natural but
mostly human. One of the major causes was the burning of land
to plant new, lucrative palm oil plantations. Although the use of
76. See [Singapore] Ministry of the Env't, PSI Reading, http://www.env.gov.sg/psil
index.html (updated daily); Malaysia Dep't of Env't, Continuous Air Quality Monitor-
ing Stations in Peninsular Malaysia. . .[and] Sabah & Sarawak (1999), http:fl
www.jas.sains.my/doe/udara2/udara2_frames.html.
77. See id.
78. See Michael Brauer & Jamal Hisham-Hashim, Fires in Indonesia: Crisis and
Reaction, 32 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH., 404A (1998).
79. See Johan W.H. Kwant, Lecture at the Singapore Environment Council Policy
Dialogue on the Southeast Asian Fires (June 4-5, 1998) (on file with author).
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fire to clear land had been made illegal in 1993 in Indonesia, 0 the
government undertook no enforcement of this law, and indeed,
with corruption, the practice continued unabated. Professor and
Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore has advocated that it is
time to name the corrupt companies and individuals who cause
these problems.8 1 "It's not El Nino [sic] that set the fires. A
United Nations report said that 80 per cent of the fires were set by
logging companies and palm oil plantations. If we want to prevent
a recurrence of the haze, the only thing to do is to stop these bad
guys."8 2 A German forest expert, Ludwig Schindler, noted that
most of the fires began on commercial plantations and on conces-
sion lands; he urged that the companies should be obliged to put
fire fighting teams and equipment in place on their concession
lands.8 3 In addition, large paper and pulp mills in Indonesia, just
west of Singapore and Malaysia, induce behavior that allows for-
est fires to develop, since they demand salvage timber and are
supplied by new incursions into forestlands. Fires have also
spread along degraded lands. Unlike Mexico, the use of "slash and
burn" agricultural clearing by small farmers was not the major
cause of the fires in Indonesia.
The pattern of international cooperation to control forest fires
in Indonesia and the other areas of Southeast Asia has been devel-
oping for some years. Because of past cooperation, a system had
developed to cooperate to track the fires in Indonesia. However,
the magnitude of the 1997 and 1998 fires were greater than ex-
pected and the system of cooperation to supply assistance to fight
the fires was not up to the magnitude of the task. Fire and air
pollution smoke incidents had taken place in Indonesia before the
80. See Simon S.C. Tay, South East Asian Forest Fires: Haze Over ASEAN and
Int'l Envtl. Law, 7 RECIEL 198, 199 (1998).
81. See Leong Chan Teik, Land Clearing by Fire: 'Name the Bad Guys', STRAITS
TIMES, June 5, 1998, at 53.
82. Id. Professor Tommy Koh has said that the "only thing to do to prevent the
haze from recurring" is to "[sitop the 'bad guys' who clear land by setting fires by
publicising [sic] their names and mobilising [sic] public opinion against them." Id.
83. See Dominic Nathan, Repeat of Fires a 'Death Penalty; The Kalimantan Fires
Which May Flare Up During the July Dry Season Will Be 10 Times More Devastating
than the 1982-83 Episode, Says Fire Expert, STRAITS TIMES, May 28, 1998.
Plantation forests are "an invitation to fire," he said, because they dry out
very quickly and humidity levels are much lower than in natural forests.
The undergrowth is a good fuel source to spread the fires as well, he ad-
ded. "A second fire will sweep through these areas faster and the dead
trees will be excellent fuel. Fires will be much hotter and the flames
higher."
Id. (referring to words spoken by Mr. Ludwig Schindler, a German forest fire expert).
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1997-98 crisis in 1982-83, 1987, 1991, and 1994.84 As a result, a
conference was called by Indonesia in Bandung in 1992, following
the 1991 fires.8 5 The 1982-83 fires had caused some $8-9 billion
worth of damage, and those a decade later were more severe.8 6
The Bandung Conference recommended a number of mea-
sures of international cooperation to prepare Indonesia and other
states to be able to cope with the forest fire problem. The purpose
was the development of an international program to initiate a
"Long-Term, Integrated Forest Fire Management Programme" for
Indonesia.8 7 The Programme was to involve national agencies in-
volved in forest fire control, and international experts and donors.
Beginning in 1995, Indonesia's Environmental Impact Manage-
ment Agency (BAPEDAL) established a "National Coordination
Team on Land and Forest Fire Management."88 Projects were
launched by the Canadian, German, Japanese, and United States
bilateral aid agencies, and by the European Union and the U.N.
Food and Agricultural Organization.8 9 A workshop in 1997 devel-
oped "National Guidelines on the Protection of Forests Against
Fires," and in 1998 the Bogor Agricultural University established
the Research Center for Forest Fire and Land Studies.90
The Bandung strategy did engage the system of international
cooperation. It stimulated the development of a forest fire man-
agement program in the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN). The ASEAN member states conducted workshops and
meetings between 1992 and 1996 on "Transboundary Haze Pollu-
tion."91 This led to one bilateral agreement, and on December 12,
1997, Malaysia and Indonesia entered into a Bilateral Memoran-
dum of Understanding to jointly tackle the "haze problem" (mean-
ing the transboundary air pollution) and to manage any other
disasters. 92 It also led to multilateral undertakings. For instance,
in 1998, based on the 1997 ASEAN Regional Haze Action Plan
described below, the Asian Development Bank provided financial
support through a Regional Economic Technical Assistance
84. See JOHANN G. GOLDAMMER, SING. ENVTL. COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNI-
CAL COOPERATION IN SE ASIA: INT'L CONTRIBUTIONS (1998).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 2.
87. Id. at 4
88. Id. at 5.
89. See GOLDAMMER, supra note 84, at 5.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 8.
92. See id.
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(RETA) to assist ASEAN to strengthen cooperation among the
ASEAN states affected by the fires and the air pollution from the
smoke.93
At a meeting in June of 1995, the ASEAN Environment Min-
isters agreed on the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary
Pollution, 94 which forms the basis for the ASEAN Regional Haze
Action Plan. Parenthetically, it can be noted that the gentleness
of phrase by which the transboundary air pollution is referred to
as "haze," describing its national manifestation in the polluted
states, is a diplomatic way to avoid having to confront the states
that cause the problem with the issues of state responsibility that
are evident here. Cooperation is encouraged if the issues of liabil-
ity are set aside. As Professor Simon S.C. Tay has observed,
ASEAN policy and practice build consensus and cooperation by
recognizing "the norm of non-interference in another state's af-
fairs," by adopting "non-binding plans, instead of treaties and le-
galistic rules," and by relying "on national institutions and
actions, rather than a stronger central bureaucracy."95
The Secretary General of ASEAN, Dato' Ajit Singh, has de-
scribed the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution
as consisting of three program areas: Transboundary Atmospheric
Pollution, Transboundary Ship-borne Pollution and Trans-
boundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes. In each programme
area, the objectives, strategies, activities and institutional ar-
rangements are further elaborated. The Plan of Cooperation also
contains a section on resources and extra regional support which
describes the various sources of technical expertise and financial
assistance that are available or can be mobilised to support
ASEAN's efforts in implementing the Plan. The Plan further in-
cludes a section on implementation and evaluation which outlines
the steps required to implement the Plan and evaluate the pro-
gress made.96
The Plan provides for a short-term strategy to "prevent an-
thropogenically induced forest fires, especially in land clearing ac-
tivities in timber and agricultural estates and transmigration
projects," by prohibiting the "burning of biomass generated largely
by development projects during dry periods," and by early detec-
93. See id.
94. Forward to ASEAN SECRETARIAT, ASEAN COOPERATION PLAN ON TRANS-
BOUNDARY POLLUTION (1997) [hereinafter ASEAN PLAN].
95. See Tay, supra note 80, at 200.
96. See ASEAN PLAN, supra note 94, at 2.
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tion of fires and enhancing communications to share information
and deploy relevant activities.97 Long-term goals include finding
alternative uses of biomass and employing zero burning practices.
The air pollution of 1997 stimulated implementation of the
1995 Cooperation Plan through the actions set forth in The Re-
gional Haze Action Plan. The 1997 fires produced very acute re-
gional air pollution from July to October of 1997 in Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and to a lesser extent in the
Philippines and Thailand. The public was demanding action be-
cause of the unprecedented health problems affecting, literally,
millions of people in these states. The Regional Haze Action Plan
has three primary objectives: "(a) to prevent land and forest fires
through better management policies and enforcement; (b) to es-
tablish operational mechanisms to monitor land and forest fires;
and (c) to strengthen regional land and forest fighting capability
and other mitigation measures."98 The activities identified as pri-
orities to attain these ends are all technical, e.g., preparing inven-
tories, enhancing remote sensing of fire phenomena, developing a
common air quality index, better communications and coopera-
tion. The institutional arrangements involve greater roles for the
ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Center (ASMC) and the
ASEAN Institute of Forest Management (AIMF). ASEAN "should
explore ways to work closely" with the following list of bodies in
order "to enhance cooperation to combat forest fire": the ASEAN
Working Group on Forestry; ASEAN-EC Joint Consultative Com-
mittee (JCC) Sub-Committee on Forest; Brunei-Indonesia-Malay-
sia-Philippines (BIMP), and the East ASEAN Growth Areas
(EAGA) Sub-Committee on Forest.99
It is evident from the details of the Plan that it is a rudimen-
tary set of recommendations, rather far removed from actually
building the capacity in any single nation to more effectively com-
bat the forest fires. This may be partially ascribed in inexperi-
ence, especially with fires on such a vast scale. However, it is also
the result of the weakness of the ASEAN Environment Ministries,
vis A vis the economic development ministries, and the fact that
many of the fires are associated with powerful plantation and tim-
ber developers who either do not wish to have government scruti-
nize their activities or have corruptly prevented government from
enforcing the applicable laws supervising their endeavors. None-
97. Id. at 3.
98. See Tay, supra note 80, at 241, 260.
99. See ASEAN PLAN, supra note 94, at 3-5.
480 [Vol. 18
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol18/iss2/9
FOREST FIRES
theless, the full agreement on the strategies established a firm
foundation on which to build more substantive work, which may
promise more immediate benefit for fire fighting and prevention.
The Regional Haze Action Plan, underwritten by the Asian
Development Bank's RETA , takes the Co-operation Plan to a
stronger level of endeavor. This Action Plan expressly calls for:
(a) an adoption of legislation to ban open burning; (b) strict en-
forcement of laws; (c) more effective systems of air quality moni-
toring of all sources of air pollution; (d) guidelines to discourage
activities which can lead to land and forest fires; and (e) operating
procedures for the early mobilization of resources to prevent the
spread of fires. 100 It spells out the roles for regional monitoring
through ASMC. It includes a detailed plan for strengthening na-
tional and regional fire fighting capability; inventories of existing
capacity; compiling lists of needed equipment; acquisition of such
equipment; establishing operating procedures to deploy fire-fight-
ing resources in each country; regional fire-fighting operations;
and for establishing a mechanism to update the Regional Haze
planning. A Regional Haze Task Force is to meet monthly to re-
view the progress on implementing the Plan. 0 1 In May of 1998,
ASEAN convened an inception workshop on strengthening
ASEAN capacity to mitigate transboundary haze, and the cooper-
ation continues at a technical level to advance aspects of the Ac-
tion Plan.
One striking aspect of the ASEAN Action Plan is that it is
essentially a call for consistent and parallel measures at the na-
tional level. Only the ASMC role in providing regional services
that none of the states can secure on their own, is truly opera-
tional, and it only detects the problem and its scope. In the area of
fire prevention and response, virtually nothing is outlined for in-
ternational cooperation. The Action Plan does provide that na-
tional fire fighting measures will be strengthened by establishing
"an operating procedure to activate the deployment of the fire-
fighting resources in each country for regional fire-fighting opera-
tions." 10 2 However, the financial crisis in the region and the polit-
ical and socio-economic transformations in Indonesia have meant
that there has been neither the rapid development of national for-
est fighting teams, or a management system for the regional de-
100. See ASS'N OF SOUTHEASTERN ASIAN NATIONS, REGIONAL HAZE ACTION PLAN
(1997), available at http://www.asean.or.id/function/pajhaze.htm.
101. See id.
102. Id. para. 11(d).
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ployment of forest fighting resources. All the Asian Development
Bank funds are for studies and analysis, and do not supply the
needed cooperative action itself.
While the ASEAN Action Plan is sound, it is evident that the
magnitude of the forest fire problem is far greater than the cur-
rent levels devoted to implementing the Plan. This is a dimension
of cooperation that needs to be realized in the future. Perhaps, in
response to the Asian Development bank studies, the further sup-
port will be forthcoming, but, in terms of producing a sound forest
fire prevention and fighting capacity, the duty to cooperate re-
mains to be fulfilled. While these efforts at regional cooperation
proceeded, the fires burned. Despite the scramble to cope with the
fires and the mounting damage, it took the return of the monsoon
season rain to extinguish the widespread fires. 10 3 In terms of the
1997-98 fires, the allocation of material, technical assistance, and
finance from the international community was wholly inadequate
to combat the raging fires. In light of the proportionality test, the
states cooperating together failed to marshal the activity to satisfy
their duty to cooperate. In undertaking these altogether too weak
measures, one is reminded of the maxim that "good intentions
pave the way to Hell." The fires were a Hell for anyone who con-
fronted them, and the International Law obligation to cooperate
was ineffective in producing action proportionate to the need. It is
likely that the phenomenon of transboundary air pollution will be
repeated, with the attendant loss of life, biodiversity, and natural
resources.
C. The United Nations' Tentative Considerations of Forest
Fires
If the regional and bilateral efforts at cooperation in the cases
of Mexico and Indonesia were inadequate to the challenge, is there
a role for the international community represented in the United
Nations? The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
had long worked on fires as a matter of technical assistance in
forest management. The U.N. Division of Humanitarian Affairs
in New York in the past has assisted in organizing relief for states
engulfed in vast forest fires, along with other "natural" disasters.
But the 1997-98 worldwide fire phenomenon in raised the legiti-
103. See Southeast Asia's Haze Clears as Monsoon Rains Begin, (Austl. Broad.
Corp., Nov. 19, 1997).
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mate question of whether the United Nations should facilitate
wider international cooperation to cope with fires.
In order to build consensus that international cooperative
measures were needed, the U.N. system has convened numerous
meetings and consultations of experts. These meetings, in and of
themselves, do not produce immediate action. It can take some
years before the political consensus emerges to support a new
U.N. cooperative venture and for the financial support to be
donated by states to allow the cooperation to advance. In the in-
terim, of course, the problem of the forest fires continues to get
worse and little is done to actually work on resolving the problem.
At best, the meetings build toward the day action will be agreed
upon; at worst, the meetings educate a range of officials and give
the appearance of activity which is too often disconnected to reme-
dial measures.
The acute publicity given to the fires in 1997 and 1998
prompted the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
to convene a meeting of experts on "Coordination of U.N. Response
to Indonesian Fires" on April 20-21, 1998, in Geneva, Switzer-
land.104 That meeting was followed by a World Meteorological Or-
ganization Workshop (WMO) on "Regional Transboundary Smoke
and Haze in South-East Asia" in Singapore on June 2-5, 1998105
and the WMO approved a "Programme To Address ASEAN Re-
gional Transboundary Smoke (PARTS)." 10 6 The World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) convened a workshop in Lima, Peru, on August
3-7, 1998 on "Guidelines for Forest Fire Emergencies." 10 7 In late
1998, the WMO and the U.N. International Decade for Natural
Disaster Relief convened an inter-agency review and Retrospec-
tive of the 1997-98 El Nifio events.
UNEP's Executive Director, Dr. Klaus Topfer, announced
that UNEP would take on a central coordinating role for building
capacity to cope with forest fires.108 UNEP, for instance, is under-
104. See Kang Siew Li, Malaysia, EU to Help Train Indonesia's Fire Fighter, Busi-
NESS TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at 2.
105. See Not Bad This Year?, STRAITS TIMES, June 3, 1998, at 2.
106. See WMO WORKSHOP ON REGIONAL TRANSBOUNDARY SMOKE AND HAZE IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.uni-freiberg.de/fireglobe/iffn/
country/un/unl.htm.
107. See U.N. FAO/ECE/ILO Team of Specialists on Forest Fire - Minutes of Meet-
ing (May 1998), available at http://www.uni-freiburg.de/fireglobe/iffn/org/ecefao/
ece_l.htm.
108. UNEP Executive Director Welcomes Indonesian Rains but Stresses UN Forest
Fighting Efforts Must Continue (Apr. 28, 1998), available at http://www.grida.no/inf/
news/news98/news28.htm.
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taking to assist "the development and improvement of the fire
early warning component of the action plan within the UNEP/
GEF project on Emergency Response to Combat Forest Fires in
South-East Asia."10 9 The Global Environmental Faculty (GEF) al-
located to UNEP a grant of $850,000 for work in Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines in order to set up
the basic consultation procedures for the deployment of emer-
gency fire fighting help as between the governments, the interna-
tional agencies, and non-governmental organizations. The
product will be public education about fire prevention and ulti-
mately "a strategy to combat the fires, and make recommenda-
tions to donors." 1 0 The UNEP efforts are intended to complement
the WMO/NOAA Programme To Address ASEAN Regional Trans-
boundary Smoke (PARTS), which will result in an aerial fire sur-
veillance regime for Sumatra under a Sub-Regional Fire Fighting
Arrangement. UNEP has indicated that it is ready also to work
with the U.N. Development Programme on regional protocols and
agreements in Asia, although no negotiations for such have been
indicated."'
The commendable willingness of UNEP's Executive Director
to serve a coordinating role in coping with forest fires is subject to
the willingness of the nations to support that role. There is rarely
coordination among the national positions among the different in-
ternational organs. A nation can take a leadership role in one
arena through certain agencies, such as NOAA's contribution of
remote sensing and monitoring help in South East Asia, and take
a small role through another agency, such as the United States
Agency for International Development's weak presence in the
Asian forest fire area, and higher public profile but similarly weak
involvement in the assistance to Mexico. Similarly, whether or
not to support a UNEP coordination role will be initially decided
by the United States State Department delegation to the UNEP
Governing Council meetings in Nairobi. Other nations have a
similarly segmented decision-making process.
Even among international agencies it is not clear that other
segments would be responsive to UNEP leadership. Others have
proposed a different model of cooperation. For instance, a U.N.
FAO and U.N. Economic Commission for Europe Team of Special-
ists on Forest Fires prepared a multi-agency program proposal to
109. See Illueca, supra note 74.
110. Id.
111. See id.
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link UNEP, FAO, UNESCO, WMO, the International Tropical
Timber Organizations (ITTO), and the IDNDR in a coordinate ef-
fort at cooperation. The initiative was endorsed by a U.N. FAO!
ECE/ILO Conference on "Forest, Fire and Global Change," held at
Shushenskoe in the Russian Federation in 1996.112 The FAO and
U.N. ECE Team of Specialist on Forest Fires had earlier submit-
ted the proposal as "A Possible Role of the U.N. System in Fire
Research and Wildfire Disaster Management" as an Annex of the
Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World, at the World Conference on
Natural Disaster Reduction (Yokahama, May 1994),113 and it was
considered at the International Conference on "Wildland Fire '97"
in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada."14
Thus, in the aftermath of the 1997-98 forest fire catastrophes
around the world, it is evident that many international inter-gov-
ernmental organizations have begun to address the problem of
how to cooperate to prevent or cope with the fires. At the same
time, the present international cooperation is fragmented among
many agencies, and has such a low level of financial support that
it cannot be expected to make a significant contribution to solving
the forest fire problem. Moreover, the international assistance
seems focused primarily on the problem of southeast Asia, while
the need is for a response to build capacity in every region since
the forest fire phenomena are global and since effective capacity to
prevent and fight forest fires exists only in western Europe, Ca-
nada, the United States, and a few selected other states.
It is, therefore, fair to assess that the response of states
through their United Nations multilateral system to the duty to
cooperate is no more effective today with respect to forest fires and
transboundary air pollution than is the response at the bilateral
or regional levels. It may be that the world community must
await an even greater loss of human life and biodiversity in the
next wave of forest fires, which can take place during the next El
Nifio/Southern Oscillation period, before it will find the political
conviction to act with effectiveness that is proportionate to the
challenge.
112. See GOLDAMMER, supra note 84, at 13.
113. See id.
114. See id. (Dr. Goldammer is a participant in the U.N. FAO/ECE/ILO Team of
Specialists on Forest Fire, and is based at the Fire Ecology and Biomass Burning
Research Group, Max Planck Institute for Chemistry, c/o Freiburg University, in
Freiburg, Germany).
2001] 485
27
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
IV. The Roles for Environmental Law in Preventing Fires
If neither the public international law principles of state re-
sponsibility nor those provided by the obligation of cooperation
can provide an effective working legal framework for states to rely
upon in responding to the world-wide forest fire crisis that accom-
panies El Nifio, then what role can law serve? The still emerging
field of environmental law provides an answer. Because forest
fires are intimately a part of land stewardship, it is appropriate to
examine the contributions of environmental law as the field of law
whose doctrine and process most closely address all aspects of the
forest fire phenomena.
Environmental law is a system that works across political
borders, whether within a nation or transnational. It is a set of
rules and principles designed to bring human conduct into accord
with the scientifically understood operations of Earth's natural
systems. To be sure, it can be (and too often still is) evaluated
solely in traditional legal terms, as either municipal law or inter-
national law, but upon a deeper reflection, it is apparent that en-
vironmental law integrates both the domestic and the regional or
global levels. 115 It is this integrative role of environmental law
that makes it a most useful system for the challenge of preventing
forest fires. Environmental law builds systems and relationships
across the sectors of government agencies and the territories of
different jurisdictions, and the levels of authority from the local
government to the United Nations.
Environmental law in Indonesia or Mexico or any other state
is not an isolated sector of municipal law. It is a network of re-
lated legal regimes serving a common worldwide public policy ob-
jective. This is evident since the world's conservation of biological
diversity is a matter of common concern globally, the stabilization
of Earth's climate under the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change 1 6 depends upon containing vast releases
of carbon dioxide (whether from forest fires or other sources) into
the atmosphere as well as maintaining forests as sinks which se-
quester carbon dioxide through photosynthesis, and the sharing of
data obtained from the development of scientific studies of El
Nifio/Southern Oscillation phenomena, including the use of re-
mote sensing satellite technology from orbital space, is necessarily
115. See Nicholas A. Robinson, Comparative Environmental Law Perspectives on
Legal Regimes for Sustainable Development, 111 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 247 (1998).
116. See Non-Legally Binding Forest Principles, supra note 16, at 849.
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an effort engaging the scientists of all nations. At the regional
scale, preventing or containing forest fires is essential to safe-
guarding public health across national borders from air pollution.
These shared and common global purposes are advanced by each
nation's forest fire management systems (or the lack of them).
The methods and systems of environmental law, adapted to the
conditions and cultures of the states that embrace them, are the
relevant legal framework for forest fire prevention.
Forest fires will not be prevented unless sustainable land use
systems are established in each nation. These regimes cannot be
imposed by a treaty system, but rather must be built from the cul-
tures and environments of each nation or area. In the parlance of
"common but differentiated responsibilities," each geographic re-
gion with forest habitat has the common responsibility to prevent
forest fires, and each can and must implement this responsibility
in different ways, according to the differentiated conditions pre-
vailing in their area.
A. Forest Fires and Environmental Law In New York: An
Illustration
The role environmental law can play amidst the socio-eco-
nomic development of a state can be illustrated by the way forest
fire prevention and control functions in a state such as New York.
In the late 1800s, New York State endured devastating fires simi-
lar to those of Mexico and Indonesia. 117 New York was expanding
its economy and population rapidly, exploiting natural resources,
and building new industries based on those resources. Govern-
ment was relatively weak, and there were no programs of federal
financial or technical aid (much less international or foreign aid).
New York had no system for forest fire prevention or manage-
ment, and only some of New York's rural communities had volun-
teer fire brigades. By the late 1800's, New York was exploiting
timber resources in its Adirondack Mountains at a rapid pace.118
This was a period of rapid expansion and development of natural
resources, not unlike the conditions in Indonesia or Malaysia to-
day. New York then was a leading source of lumber; in 1850 1.6
billion board feet, or twenty percent of all lumber from any source
117. See The Insider's Guide to the Adirondacks, Chapter Highlights, available at
http://www.insiders.com/adirondacks/main-history.htm#4 (last visited May 21, 2001).
118. See id.
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in the United States came from New York. 119 By 1866, pulp mills
were established on the upper Hudson River, and by 1890 New
York was the leading source of pulp, with seventy-five mills, or a
third of all such mills in the United States. New railroad lines cut
through the Adirondack Mountains to help bring out the wood.
The branches and discarded parts of the timber littered the clear-
cut mountainsides. Sparks from the railroad engines, or from
careless logging operations, started vast forest fires, which could
not be extinguished except by rains. In the late 1880s and early
1890s, it is estimated that forest fires destroyed some 16,000 acres
across the Adirondacks. In the year after the fires, as the snow
melted, the water would wash away the topsoil and denude the
hillsides. Floodwaters would accumulate in the Hudson River and
regularly flood the capital city of Albany each spring. 120
This state of affairs was insufferable and unsustainable. It
enriched some individuals and commercial enterprises, but at the
cost of the safety and property of the citizens of Albany and other
Hudson River valley communities. The legislature, in 1885, de-
cided to create a State Forest Preserve Commission to regulate
the timber practices and establish more sustainable management
practices. Unfortunately, the Commission proved rather ineffec-
tive, in part because economic vested interests were able to influ-
ence and bribe the Commission to make few changes. In 1892, in
an attempt to protect fish and game habitat, the legislature desig-
nated large areas of the Adirondack Mountains as the Adirondack
Park, but the Commission called for lumbering on Park lands. It
became clear that a park merely created by statute would fall vic-
tim to vested economic interests. Indeed, in 1893, the then State
Governor proposed a bill, which the legislature adopted, allowing
wood to be sold from anywhere in the Adirondack Forest
Preserve. 121
This rejection of the efforts to safeguard the mountain forests
outraged the state's citizens in New York City, who looked for
stronger protection for the Adirondacks. Under the State Consti-
tution, periodically the citizens of New York gather in a conven-
tion to rewrite the state's fundamental law. By coincidence, a
Constitutional Convention was sitting during this period. Con-
119. See Lumber, COMPTON'S ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at http://www.comptons.
comencyclopedia/ARTICLES/0100/01115136_A.html.
120. See ELEANOR BROWN, THE FOREST PRESERVE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(1985).
121. See id.
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cerned citizens enlisted leading attorneys of the New York Bar,
David McClure, Louis Marshall and others, who were delegates to
the Convention, to add a constitutional provision for the Forest
Preserve. In November of 1894, the citizens voted to adopt the
new Constitution with a provision stating:
The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter acquired, consti-
tuting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall be kept as
wild forest lands. They shall not be leased, sold or exchanged, or
taken by any corporation, public or private, nor shall the timber
thereon be sold, removed or destroyed.... 12 2
New York went beyond setting aside the world's first legis-
lated "wilderness" area of forest and mountain habitat, thereby
protecting the watershed of the headwaters for the Hudson River,
its beauty, and biological diversity. These measures protected a
vast region from the abuses that fed the forest fire phenomena.
New York also established a system to organize the public to ex-
tinguish forest fires before small fires could become vast con-
flagrations. The bill that created the first Forest Commission in
1885 also established a system of local fire wardens (including au-
thority for emergency empressment of any adult individual into
the battle to combat fires, and to pay them for this service). Man-
agement of this system involved establishing forest districts and
recruiting individuals for the warden roles. After adopting the
constitutional amendment, the legislature merged the fire preven-
tion system of the former Forest Commission with the Fish and
Game Commission, which became the Forest, Fish and Game
Commission in 1897, and, in 1911, the Conservation Commission.
A cadre of state forest rangers were deployed to help recruit and
train the volunteers, and enforce laws and regulations against
negligent forestry practices.123 The state established a nursery to
raise seedlings and restore the damaged forest areas. 24
The new system was put to the test. In 1903 it did not rain
for seventy-two days. Human and natural causes ignited 500
fires, burning 460,000 acres. Major dry seasons recurred with re-
sultant fires in every decade. In 1931 New York purchased its
first airplane for use in detecting fires. The state continues to em-
ploy a team of Forest Rangers, as well as the system of volunteer
122. N. Y. CONST. art. XXV.
123. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW art. 9 (McKinney 1999).
124. See id. § 9-0105.
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firefighters. With the restoration of the forest habitat, the
Adirondack Mountains retain moisture, and the number of acres
burned is much reduced; for instance, in 1980, of 772 forest fires
fought in the Adirondacks, only some 5,400 acres were burned. 125
Since no one area can have enough forest fire fighting bri-
gades for the potentially truly massive forest fire, New York has
entered into a number of mutual aid agreements with other
states and with nearby provinces in Canada. These agreements,
termed "Compacts," are essentially treaties within the federal sys-
tem of the United States. 126 Under these agreements, New York
will send teams of trained fire fighters to other states in an emer-
gency, and other states will send their teams to New York. The
receiving state agrees to reimburse the sending state for the en-
tire expenses of sending their team. Such mutual aid agreements
allow a state to quickly assemble and deploy a sufficient cadre of
trained fight fighters and equipment to fight a significant fire rag-
ing beyond their normal fire fighting capacity.
It is instructive to note that the state of New York established
this system with five essential elements: (1) the strongest possi-
ble (constitutional) mandate for preservation of forest habitat as
watershed and habitat; (2) the regulation of lumbering and re-
lated commercial activity in and near forests, with a team of forest
rangers to oversee and enforce those regulations, and equipping
the rangers with modem fire detection and fighting equipment;
(3) the recruitment of citizen volunteers to assist in detection and
rapid extinguishing of fires; (4) the participation of an alert citi-
zenry, organized into non-governmental organizations, to help
protect the forests and advocate for improvements in their man-
agement; and (5) mutual aid agreements with other states in the
United States and provinces in Canada.
Since 1972, this system of forest protection and management,
including its strong fire-fighting element, has been incorporated
into the fabric of contemporary environmental law. New York
State now tests the quality of all streams and lakes, classifies
these surface waters, and strictly controls all discharges of pollu-
tants into them. 127 The state adopted the first Acid Deposition
125. See BROWN, supra note 120, at 140.
126. See The Northeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact, 1949, con-
tinued in 1963, reprinted in N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 9-1123.
127. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 17-0101 to -1017; see also Clean Water Act
§§ 101-618, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
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law in the United States, 128 designed to curb the air borne pollu-
tants in "acid rain," and has strong state air pollution laws. 129
New York has effective endangered species legislation, as well as
strong wildlife laws. 130 The state also adopted the Adirondack
Park Agency Act in 1971, to establish a master plan and facilitate
the adoption of land use and zoning laws for all the privately
owned lands in the area of the Park and adjacent to the "forever
wild" Forest Preserve.' 3 '
Most comprehensive, and perhaps most important of the con-
temporary environmental laws, however, is the New York State
Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA).132 Adopted in 1976,
this is New York's environmental impact assessment (EIA) law. It
is important because it governs any governmental act - including
permitting private persons to act - affecting the forests or any
other environmental resource. SEQRA requires local authorities
and state agencies alike systematically to evaluate the environ-
mental impacts of their actions and "to the maximum extent prac-
ticable, minimize or avoid adverse environmental effects." 33 In
forestlands, this analysis includes the protection of watershed,
habitat and prevention of forest fires. The EIA system cuts across
all sectors, resulting in such activities as silvaculture or road
building, recreation and tourism activity completing much the
same environmental analysis. SEQRA builds in precaution and
seeks to ensure the active consideration of the needs of future gen-
erations in governmental decision-making. 134 Most importantly,
the SEQRA process requires the identification of alternatives to
the proposed action.' 35
Finally, New York law authorizes and encourages citizens as
individuals and as members of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) to participate in the establishment of all the rules and
regulations established to protect the environment. 136 Proposed
new rules and agency SEQRA reviews are published in an Envi-
ronmental Notice Bulletin, available to the public, by the New
128. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW. § 19-0901.
129. See id. § 19-0101; see also Clean Air Act §§ 401-416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o
(1994).
130. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0539.
131. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 800-820.
132. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW art. 8.
133. Id. § 8-0109(1).
134. See id. § 8-0103.
135. See id. § 8-0109(2)(d).
136. See N.Y. A.P.A. § 100.
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York State Department of Environmental Conservation. The laws
give citizens access to all government files relevant to the protec-
tion of the environment. 137 Judicial review is authorized for any
action of any governmental body that disregards or misconstrues
the applicable environmental laws. 138 Thus, a person concerned
about the forests and the preparedness for forest fire prevention
or fighting can discover the basic facts and participate in the gov-
ernment's forest fire programs. Indeed, the state laws mandate
the government to consult with the public about the state's forest
plans and programs. 39
From this description of New York State's legal regime for the
stewardship of the forests of the state, the role of environmental
law is evident. Fire fighting is not relegated to a special sector of
government, and then starved for the funds and personnel to
make it effective. Nor is fire fighting asked to compensate for the
failures of land stewardship or negligent timbering. Rather, fire
fighting is an essential part of a system of forest stewardship.
B. Mutual Aid Agreements - A Defining Threshold for
Cooperation to Combat Forest Fires
New York State regularly deploys its forest rangers and forest
fighting equipment to other States and Provinces with which it
has negotiated mutual aid agreements. These are essentially like
treaties, 40 since the States retain the sovereignty over their lands
and forests, and have the right to enter into agreements with each
other. In an interesting precedent, Canadian Provinces have also
entered into these agreements. This formal process for preventing
and cooperation for combating forest fires can provide a useful
precedent for fashioning regional mutual aid pacts, as in the
ASEAN region, or internationally through the United Nations En-
vironment Programme.
137. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw §§ 84-90.
138. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 78.
139. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 9-0809.
To assure that all segments of the public have an opportunity to partici-
pate in the development of the plan, the planning program will be con-
ducted with a structured program of public participation. The
department shall establish procedures to keep the public informed about
the planning process and to provide opportunities for the public to con-
tribute to that process.
Id.
140. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
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Historical forest fire data for North America demonstrates
that forest fires are a constant threat and real problem. In April of
1903, fires in New York's Adirondack Mountains burned 637,000
acres. 141 In 2000, New York experienced 107 forest fires, which
were controlled and burned only 425 acres. Forest Fires in the
northeastern United States were in a similar scale, with 227 in
Maine (286 acres), 248 in New Hampshire (160 acres), 28 in Ver-
mont (67 acres), 1,854 in Massachusetts (2,735 acres), 55 in Con-
necticut (183 acres), and 82 in Rhode Island (76 acres). In
contrast, in 1999, California experienced forest fires lasting from
August through November, evacuating hundreds of people and
burning over 220,000 acres; that year a fire in Nevada burned
288,220 acres. 142 Forest fires in the western United States in
1997-98 were severe, and Congress held hearings in June of 1999
on the "Status of the Forest Service's Efforts to Reduce Cata-
strophic Wildfire Threats."143
The northeast is more humid than the west, but is has exten-
sive forest cover and the risk of fires could be great were it not for
the Northeast Forest Fire Protection Commission. Following for-
est fires in Maine in 1947 that burned over 250,000 acres, the
States decided to enter into an interstate Compact the same year
to promote effective protection and control of forest fires in the
northeastern states of the United States and adjacent portions of
Canada. 44 New York State joined together with the States of
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Is-
land, and Vermont. Congress approved the Compact in 1949.145
Quebec joined the Compact, and in 1970 New Brunswick did like-
wise; in 1997 Nova Scotia joined. Canadian Provincial participa-
tion in the Compact was approved by Congress in 1952.146
141. See National Interagency Fire Center, Historical Wildland Fire Statistics,
available at http://www.nifc.gov/stats/historicalstats.html (last modified Apr. 19,
2001).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Status of Forest Service's Efforts to Reduce Catastrophic Wildfire
Threats: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Forests & Forest Health of the
Comm. on Res., 106th Congress (June 29, 1999) (statement of Barry T. Hill, Assoc.
Dir., Energy, Resources, and Scientific Issues, Resources, Cmty., and Econ. Dev.
Div.), available at http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/106cong/forests/99jun29/
hill.htm.
144. See The Northeastern Forest Fire Protection Commission Website, available
at http://www.nffpc.com (last modified May 10, 2001).
145. Northeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact, Public L. No. 81-129,
63 Stat. 271.
146. Canada forest fire Protection Compact, Public L. No. 82-340, 66 Stat. 71.
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The Member States and Provinces of the Northeast Compact
pay membership fees based on their share of the protected area of
66,047,101 acres of forest in the region. The Commission's man-
date "is to provide the means for its member states and provinces
to coped with fires that might be beyond the capabilities of a sin-
gle member through information, technology and resource sharing
(mutual aid) activities."147 The Rules of the Commission provide
that it is a "fact finding, coordinating and deliberative body with
power to make recommendations to the member states."148 Each
Member State or Province can send three Commissioners, one
from the fire fighting service, one from its Governor and one from
is legislature. This ensures that the Commission's recommenda-
tions can be heard by each branch of government responsible for
equipping and financing forest fire protection. Over the years a
technical committee of State Foresters was set up to coordinate
training, and formulate procedures for all technical issues of fire
control. Under the over-all supervision of an Executive Commit-
tee, working teams have been set up for (a) training, (b) preven-
tion, (c) equipment, (d) aviation, and (e) fire weather. An
Executive Director manages the affairs of the Commission.
The Northeastern Compact functions well because each mem-
ber state and province has established its own professional forest
fighting agencies, with trained personnel and equipment. Each
member can call on the others for mutual aid in case of a fire that
its own team of fire fighters cannot contain. The Compact helps
advise its members on what they need to do to maintain adequate
forest fire fighting services. The Commission has a process for ac-
creditation of member services and scheduling of periodic reviews
of the services, for preparation of the findings of review teams,
and the presentation of recommendations for program improve-
ments to the full Commission.
When a state or province calls on the other Members of the
Compact for mutual aid, the fire fighting teams or equipment re-
quested are deployed. After the fire is contained, the Members re-
questing the aid pays the Member that contributed the assistance
for the costs of the services. The Compact works well.
Similar arrangements exist among the federal agencies that
manage the public lands of the United States, primarily in the
147. NORTHEAST FOREST FIRE PROTECTION COMMISSION (NFFPC), BRIEFING MAN-
UAL 3 (2000) [hereinafter NFFPC].
148. Article I, Section 1, Rules and Regulations of the Northeastern Forest Fire
Protection Commission (1994), reprinted in NFFPC, supra note 147, at 27.
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west. The U.S. Department of the Interior and Department of Ag-
riculture prepared an Action Plan for Federal Wildland Fire Man-
agement in 1996.149 The Plan calls for establishing "Geographic
Coordinating Groups" to work with all local and state and tribal
partners in forest fire management. The Plan aims to develop in-
teragency preparedness for wildfire management, including devel-
oping training tools and programs, common management
procedures and objectives, implementation strategies, and fire
prevention activities.
An Interagency Management Review Team is to establish fire
management qualifications and qualification standards. In 1997,
the U.S. Forest Service announced a goal of resolving the
problems of the large, catastrophic forest fires on the 39 million
acres of forest at high risk of fire by the year 2015. The plans call
for employing programs to monitor forest health and developing a
comprehensive strategy for reducing accumulated vegetation that
fuels fires. 150
The examples of the Northeastern Compact, and the federal
agency wildfires strategies, provide concrete examples of practical
measures that States are taking to combat forest fires. The proce-
dures, techniques, training, and financial systems have all been
developed. While that would always need to be adapted to the dif-
ferent ecological, social and economic conditions of each nation,
the broad outlines are evident. Fire fighting is an applied activity,
not merely a planning process. The sooner teams of actual fire
fighting services start to work together, with the full support of
their governments, the sooner forest fires can be brought under
control. International cooperation needs to begin from that pre-
mise. The successful models of inter-state cooperation exist. They
should be adapted and emulated. If States wish to get results,
they should insist that further international diplomatic delibera-
tions over forest fires focus on putting in place the practical fire
fighting service units, and bringing these services into cooperative
alliances. This has worked over the years in New York and in the
Northeast of North America.
149. See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR & U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FED. WILDLAND FIRE
MGMT. POLICY & PROGRAM REVIEW - IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN (1996), available
at http://www.fs.fed.us/land/wdiap.htm.
150. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON FORESTS
& FOREST HEALTH OF THE COMM. ON RES., Western Nat'l Forests: A Cohesive Strategy
is Needed to Address Catastrophic Wildfire Threats, GAO/RCED-99-65, 106th Cong.
(1999), available at http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/106congforests/rc99065.pdf.
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C. Environmental Law Goals for Sustainable Development
The illustrative case of New York is useful in the context of
states such as Indonesia and Mexico. While New York built its
systems of law and forest management gradually, the pressures
for development on natural resources in the developing nations,
and in the economies in transition, require that these States move
more rapidly to establish their environmental laws and forest fire
protection systems.
Environmental law is clearly understood as a relevant body of
law by each nation. Both Indonesia and Mexico have made the
teaching of environmental law a requirement for their law de-
grees. Both supported Agenda 21, which in Chapter 8 calls for the
strengthening of legal systems as essential for sustainable devel-
opment. 151 The public in both nations is increasingly frustrated
with the poor administration of the basically sound environmental
legislation, and there is growing impatience because of the evi-
dence of corruption in the administration of the laws generally in
both states. Both nations have reform oriented governments at
present. The stewardship and remedial aspects that characterize
the observance of environmental law in New York are not yet real-
ized in these states. Nonetheless, the gradual strengthening of
environmental law will bring the benefits of sustainable
development.
It is important to note that New York developed its forest
fighting and environmental law capabilities largely by itself, as a
developing economy and society. There was no system of foreign
aid, and the duty of cooperation in international law had not yet
emerged. In this respect, the illustration of New York is also ger-
mane to the needs of developing states. As Ambassador and Law
Professor Tommy Koh has observed, "Developing countries must
avoid the mistake that co-operation at the international level can
substitute for the needed sacrifices and hard work at the national
level." 152 When New York experienced its worst forest fires, the
State was rich in natural resources but at the time was squander-
ing its forest wealth, and no foreign aid came to help New York
with its problems. There was no international cooperation at the
151. See AGENDA 21, supra note 22, paras. 8.13 to 8.26.
152. Tommy Koh, The Quest for World Order; Perspectives of a Pragmatic Idealist,
INST. POL'Y STUD., at 63. Professor Koh elaborates this point as follows: "Our dream
of a more prosperous and more equitable world can only be realized if all of us are
prepared to work hard at home and to develop the habit of consultation and co-opera-
tion at the international level." Id.
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time, and aid from the federal government would not come into
existence until the institution of the Income Tax and the expan-
sion of federal government roles during process of rebuilding the
economy after the Great Depression in the 1930s.
Developing nations can take measures to control their forest
fires in relatively short order. They can do so in cooperation with
neighboring states. International organizations can provide the
funds for the basic training and equipment needed to get forest
fire services in place. But just as the fires destroy the resources
base of each nation, it must essentially be the decision of each na-
tion to invest its own financial and human resources in systems to
combat fires. Since it takes a disciplined force to fight fires, and
airplanes are needed, it would make sense for states initially to
direct their armed forces to assume the responsibility for combat-
ing forest fires.
Indeed, in light of the markedly tepid response by the interna-
tional community to the forest fire problems during 1997-98, it is
safe to say that developing states and economies in transition can
only rely upon themselves to establish the management systems
that will prevent or control forest fires in the future. Current
levels of bilateral and multilateral assistance are inadequate to
carry the burden of subsidizing the capacity building for national
or sub-national forest fighting. The Asian Development Bank
RETA or the UNEP proposals for forest fire monitoring both pay
scant attention to the reality that the forest fires must be pre-
vented locally, and contained and extinguished locally. Neither
makes strengthening environmental law a prerequisite to sustain-
able development of forest and other natural resources.
The New York experience confirms that forest fire prevention
succeeds when self-help is employed. If international assistance
and cooperation are to advance the cause of sustainable develop-
ment, then their objective must be to catalyze local measures for
self-sufficiency, and then link these in effective mutual aid sys-
tems. When nations, like Indonesia and Mexico, already have
made a commitment to such self-sufficiency by enacting steward-
ship norms through their national environmental laws, interna-
tional development efforts would benefit from recognizing and
strengthening those national efforts. This can be done on two
fronts. The first is to strengthen the systems that characterize
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environmental law in each nation,153 and not to shy away from
such a task simply because certain economic interests seek to con-
tinue their exploitation of natural resources. The second is to pro-
vide the basic training for community leaders to organize local fire
protection programs.
Community organization to fight fires is the first step in self-
sufficiency. Examples of organizing in this way can be found in
developing nations. For instance, the first volunteer fire-fighting
corps in Chile was organized in 1850 in Valparaiso. The model
took hold there much as it did in New York State. There are now
some 35,000 volunteers in 1,100 fire companies in Chile. Even in
rural areas there are usually one or two volunteer fire companies.
These are organized under 276 fire departments, or corps, and
they raise funds locally for a barracks, a fire truck, communica-
tions equipment, and fire fighting tools. The corps are essentially
private non-governmental corporations. In 1970, the Junta Na-
cional de Cuerpos de Bomberos de Chile was founded to provide
national integration of the system. There is a National Fire Fight-
ers Academy (Academia Nacional de Bomberos) which coordinates
the training for all the volunteers, and the national budget allo-
cates some $11 million to the network. 5 4
Building this community volunteer network to fight fires is
fundamental to successful forest fire management. It is used in
other sectors, some also related to El Nifio phenomena. For in-
stance, in India, Dr. M.S. Swaminathan instituted an integrated
monsoon management strategy to micromanage the planting of
crops based on actual rainfall during the problematic El Niflo pe-
riod. As he describes it,
First, establish in every district a Crop Weather Watch Group
consisting of climatologists, farm scientists, representatives of
153. It is remarkable that relatively little assistance goes toward implementing
Chapter 8 of Agenda 21; international and bilateral aid agencies will give assistance
for drafting legislation, but little to nothing for training personnel or assisting in the
development of grass roots programs at implementation. An exception to this is the
assistance that the Asian Development Bank gave to the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) to conduct a capacity-building
course on teaching environmental law at University level for the professors of law
from fifteen Asian and Pacific nations in 1997 and 1998, in cooperation with the Asia-
Pacific Centre for Environmental Law at the National University of Singapore, and
UNEP; see also Aarhus Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Envi-
ronmental Matters, June 25, 1998, available at 1998 WL 750201.
154. See Chile: Fire Prevention & Fire Fighting Equip. Market, INDUS. SECTOR
ANALYsIs, July 28, 1998.
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farmers' and women's organizations, members of the mass me-
dia and officials of government and financial institutions. The
tasks to be addressed by the group include monitoring monsoon
progression, developing contingency plans and alternative crop-
ping strategies to suit different weather probabilities, building
seed reserves of alternative crops and intensifying efforts in the
area of water harvesting and minor irrigation. 155
To extend this approach, he advocates training "in each village
panchayat at least one male and one female member in the sci-
ence and art of monsoon management."156 The unpredictability of
the effect of El Nifto on the important monsoon rains for agricul-
ture requires this community level involvement in cropping. The
same approach can be seen in the initial organization of fire dis-
tricts and towns in New York, or the volunteer fire corps in Chile.
What is missing from the reports of the follow-up to the Mexi-
can forest fires, or the ASEAN Regional Haze Action Plan, and the
Asian Development Banks RETA to assist after the Indonesian
fires, is a commitment to assign high priority to this sort of com-
munity based organizing. There is also a lack of interest in creat-
ing economic instruments to generate the funds within each
nation to secure the needed equipment and underwrite the on-go-
ing training. Beyond establishing user fees, especially for the
larger scale commercial agriculture and silvaculture enterprises,
to pay for building fire-fighting capacity, little to no attention has
been paid to develop more sophisticated economic instruments
such as a fire insurance system. Not only would insurance help
compensate for unavoidable fire losses and prepare local commu-
nities to fight the next wave of fires, but by employing graduated
levels of insurance premium fees, the system could reward those
low risk insurers who employ strong fire prevention systems while
assessing higher fees to high risk enterprises. This system would
thereby provide economic incentives for sound fire prevention
practices. The inattention to insurance in the aftermath of the
1997-98 fires is a mistake. It is more than a little ironic that the
World Bank and others are examining new emission trading sys-
tems for emitting and sequestering carbon dioxide under prospec-
tive green house gas management schemes for the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, and virtually no one
155. M.S. Swaminathan, Pokhran, El Nio and the Monsoon, THE HINDU, May 28,
1998, at 12 (emphasis in original).
156. Id.
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is developing the needed fire insurance programs to help ensure
that sustainable local economies will be there to manage and safe-
guard forests.
Similarly, there are proven forestry techniques to avert fires,
and zero burn techniques for palm oil plantations and other agri-
cultural activity. Environmental laws are needed to induce the
use of sustainable agricultural practices. The Golden Hope Plan-
tations Berhad in Malaysia was recognized by UNEP as its
Global 500 Roll of Honor at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit
for shredding old palm fronts and vegetation and replanting the
new palms amidst the decomposing old, rather than burning the
biomass. 157 This technique should be taught and mandated
throughout Indonesia, Malaysia, and elsewhere as a sound and
sustainable agricultural practice that obviates the need for burn-
ing and thus lowering incidents of forest fires.
New equipment, such as the Bombardier aerospace turboprop
amphibian airplanes, which can load with surface water while in
flight ("water scooping") and make repeated passes delivering
water to remote fire areas, can be added to a nations defense
forces. There is no rational explanation for a nation having a
large air force "to defend" against a theoretical foreign military
force, and yet have no equipment to help fight off the common foe
of fire. Spain, France, Greece, Italy, and Canada, along with
heavily populated areas such as Los Angeles County in California,
employ these planes effectively. 158 Thailand has acquired two
such aircraft. Developing nations cannot afford to squander funds
on military aircraft which may or may not ever be needed against
"theoretically possible" enemies when their nations need these fire
fighting aircraft to fight recurring and predictable fires. The shift
in military budgets for this purpose is within the capacity of each
developing nation to achieve. In Indonesia, most areas are within
a short distance of water. In Mexico, while water may be more
remote, the fires are often in places inaccessible to fire fighting
equipment and fire suppression by aircraft may be essential.
Thoughtful analysis on the problem of transboundary air pol-
lution from forest fires by Prof. Simon S.C. Tay notes that nations
have not worked effectively at the regional or bilateral level to col-
laborate to end the fires, for instance, as in not creating a regional
157. GOLDEN HOPE PLANTATIONS BERHAD, THE ZERO BURNING TECHNIQUE FOR OIL
PALM CULTIVATION (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 1997).
158. See Ed Smockum, Dousing With Aircraft-Water Bomber Gives a Flying Start,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at 16.
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fund to pay for measure to tackle the "haze" problem. If the North-
east Compact can set up a common fund, so can other regions. At
an Asia Pacific Regional Workshop on Transboundary Pollution in
Singapore in May of 1998, Prof. Tay advocated six measures in the
private sector that would induce more government action: (a) a
full account of the costs and losses from the pollution would "be a
basis for affected states to make the economic commitment to fund
the necessary steps for the prevention and control of future fires";
(b) a regional treaty to set environmental limits and establish a
basis for holding states responsible; (c) establishing access to the
courts for private citizens to seek compensation for their losses; (d)
having a more open and routine review of regional plans (such as
in ASEAN), including a range of experts and NGOs; (e) conducting
joint training of fire fighting units in the region, to build confi-
dence in transboundary cooperation as well the enhanced skills in
fire fighting; and (f) connecting regional economic incentives to
better fire prevention, as in regional trade relations.159
Professor Tay has effectively argued that inactivity in south-
east Asia results from the perspective that governments, media,
and the public take to the problem. If the air pollution is seen as
merely haze, a local concern, as merely an unusual El Nio event,
caused by many small fire incidents with no one at fault, and solv-
able just by organizing fire fighting, then there will be no effective
response to the 1997-98 fires. If, on the other hand, fires are seen
an recurring dangers, the air pollution as a threat to health, that
fires can be prevented more effectively than fought, and that com-
mercial enterprises can be held accountable for their behavior,
then a government can be motivated to act.
Of course, inertia tends to move governments toward the first
characterization. News about the fires in the media and regular
reporting of the health impacts and costs of the transboundary air
pollution, can build political pressure toward collaboration to de-
velop more effective fire prevention and containment. The strate-
gies recommended by Professor Tay depend on full and
transparent sharing of knowledge about the fires and their causes,
and this in turn on ensuring access to information, as well as pub-
lic participation in decision-making, and ultimately access to jus-
tice. These principles lie at the heart of environmental law
procedures, and have recently been reaffirmed in the United Na-
159. Inertia Over Haze Problem - Need to Work Out Full Costs of Haze, STRAITS
TIMES, May 28, 1998, at 33.
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tions Economic Commission for Europe's Convention on Freedom
of Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice signed
in Aarhus, Denmark, in June of 1998.160 The pre-conditions in
civil society, for Professor Tay's recommendations to take root,
will depend on other regions, beyond Europe, developing similar
agreements.
V. Conclusions
Much more is at stake in the response to the forest fires of
1997 and 1998 than the cause of fire fighting. The strengthening
of civil society, to become responsible for the stewardship of fire
and forests, is a fundamental premise for sustainable develop-
ment. Careful use of natural resources will not advance amidst
corruption and avoidance of environmental management systems.
Nations with inefficient or corrupt governments will neglect good
forest management and experience an escalation of forest fire
damage and loss.
Yet it is not simply the developing states that must reorder
their thinking if the forest fires are to be contained. There is a
myopia in developed lands as well. Most environmental organiza-
tions devote substantial resources to establishing preserves to
safeguard Earth's biodiversity, and yet spend virtually nothing on
building the community level systems for forest conservation and
forest fire prevention. The environmental advocates and actors
need to add the challenge of forest fire prevention and manage-
ment to their priorities. They need to help support the training of
local forest rangers and facilitate the development volunteer fire
prevention and fighting programs. Because the citizens and par-
liaments of developed states tend to assume that the fire phenom-
ena is under control in their nations, they seem oblivious to the
fact that it is out of control in most other regions.
The fires of 1997 and 1998 may have elevated forest fires onto
the global agenda of concerns for journalists, but foreign minis-
tries and national governments still appear not to have embraced
that agenda. For many leaders in government and non-govern-
mental sectors alike, the economic problems flowing from the eco-
nomic depression in the markets of southeast Asia and the weak
economy in Mexico, and the stressed economies of Brazil and the
160. See Aarhus Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Infor-
mation, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environ-
mental Matters, June 25, 1998, available at 1998 WL 750201.
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states in Africa, have eclipsed the worry about forest fires. The
rains return and the urgency to prepare for the next wave of fires
is clouded over.
Fire fighting in the biologically rich areas of the Earth re-
quires an environmental priority at least as sustained and impor-
tant as that served by the International Committee of the Red
Cross and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Humanita-
rian concerns never leave the agenda, and the team of volunteers
who mobilize in the wake of natural disaster or armed conflict are
always in training and preparation. If the United Nations system
is not prepared to mobilize the systems for the sustainable use
and defense of forests, then organizations, such as the Interna-
tional Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Re-
sources (IUCN), should be encouraged to add this work to their
agenda and commit to it for the long-term.
The work of IUCN, through its World Commission on Pro-
tected Areas or its Species Survival Commission, will be gravely
threatened by a repeat of the forest fires of 1997-98. For instance,
in the Primorski Krai, a maritime region in the Far East of the
Russian Federation, there were 120 large-scale forest fires out of
546 fires in 1998, which burned 43,820 hectares of forest-land.
These were the worst forest fires in the region since 1921 and
burned some 4,000-hectare in the Sikhote-Alinski and Lazovski
Zapovedniki, which are the habitat for the endangered Siberian
Tiger. Non-governmental organizations contributed a mere
$18,500 for fighting the fires, and rainfall in July 1998 finally ex-
tinguished the fires. 161 Such set backs to biodiversity protection
can be seen in every region where forest fire damage escalates.
The states that are members of IUCN and support its work would
benefit from examining how this intergovernmental organization,
founded in 1948, with its forest and wildlife ministry members
and NGO members, can address the new global threats of forest
fires. IUCN may be able to catalyze the international cooperation
which is presently so disproportionate to the need.
161. See Siberian Tiger Habitat Threatened-This Time, It's Fire, RussIAN CON-
SERV. NEWS, Summer 1998, at 32.
The major tools for fighting fires were haversacks with water, shovels,
and motor saws. Crews were transported to the place of fires by cars and
bulldozers. Firefighters then raked aside the soil to prevent further
spread of fires, extinguished fires with water, destroyed the deadfall.
Helicopters, due to high costs, were used only to supplement ground
crews.
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Put positively, it is the local authority that must be the first
defense against fire. In the parlance of the European Union, con-
siderations of subsidiarity support this conclusions. At the same
time, regionally there must be a shared effort towards training
and transferring forest fire prevention knowledge and technology.
At the inter-regional or international level, there must be sharing
of remote sensing data for the detection of forest fires and gather-
ing and disseminating information on climatic and weather condi-
tions. Environmental law can shape the links between sustaining
and managing forests in ways to prevent fires and coordinating
the fire detection and fighting. It is a continuum, from the local to
the global levels, transcending the traditional lines between gov-
ernmental authority, and international and municipal law.
What animates the progressive development of international
law today? Principles of state responsibility and international co-
operation provide scant help in coping with forest fires around the
world because of the way they treat, in a static way, the status of
relations among states. The law must evolve to be relevant to so-
cial problems or it becomes a dead letter. Environmental law
emerges as a legal system that is evolving as the needs of nations,
people, and nature dictate, and with the scientific advances in bet-
ter understanding nature. The Earth's people cannot add more
concentrations of larger numbers of people to fragile forest areas
and fail to also improve their management of the forest ecology.
Forest fires are a clear and present danger, not merely to ter-
ritory within a nation, but globally and transnationally. It is un-
likely that a worldwide approach to fires will become a priority, at
least until the next wave of El Nifio induced forest fire tragedies.
Until that time, the role of environmental law must be to support
procedures that provide remediation to those afflicted by fires and
catalyze reforms to avert such afflictions were possible. This
transformational mission is the hallmark of environmental law.
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